Evergrande has been a ticking time bomb over the years building up mountains of debt. If not repaid, Evergrande will collapse and wreak havoc across the entire Chinese economy and population. For a company that used to dominate its industry, owns the football club Guangzhou Evergrande F.C., and even possesses two major theme park brands, this is undoubtedly an ugly fall from grace. The once esteemed company has had to publicly announce their inability to pay off loans in time, hire financial advisors to save themselves from their abysmal quagmire, and plead to private institutions and the government to restructure unpaid debts for their apparently bleak future. 

Founded in 1996 by former steel factory worker and businessman Xu Jiayin, Evergrande grew to be China’s largest property developer in 2021. Evergrande’s primary business provided millions of middle-class Chinese with the opportunity to purchase real estate in a rapidly urbanising economy. Evergrande Real Estate currently owns more than 1,300 projects in more than 280 cities across China, with generating a revenue exceeding 500 billion yuan last year. Although there is no good ending for Evergrande and its empire, it remains to be seen what damage lies ahead for China. It is all in the hands of Xi and his government to either take action in mitigating the aftermath for his country, or to let the company crumble and send a crucial message for the future. 

The compounding problems of Evergrande  

The corporation missed a payment of $83.5 million for an offshore bond on September 23. Evergrande did manage to broker a deal over a previous $35.9 million interest payment on a domestic bond, but negotiations become increasingly unlikely as lenders know Evergrande will only have the means to pay off a few of them in the position they are in. It is a time of “eerie silence”, said the head of Asia fixed income at Principal Global Investors in Singapore, Howe Chung Wan, as the world waits for the domino effect of unpaid debt to commence.  

Currently Evergrande possess more than $300 billion in debt spread across 171 domestic banks and 121 other financial firms. In 2017, Evergrande was valued at over $45 billion, whereas in 2021, their value is a sixth of what it used to be at $7.4 billion. Extravagant ventures in real estate and other industries are all accountable for this mass accumulation of debt.  

Their main property business had been bleeding money for years because Evergrande erected meaningless apartments which would not house anyone. China’s population has been continuously increasing, but by no means as much as the rate of construction of countless high-rises to accommodate them.  

The instant, failproof profit thought to have been earned through construction incentivized Evergrande to push their contractors to work faster. Minimal time to plan and build resulted in risky financial decisions and insufficient measures to secure longevity and safety. They created a non-existent market for apartments and flooded it with excess ones that will never be bought or used.  

The far reach of the aftermath  

The sheer scale of Xu’s enterprise and its links around the economy means that millions of people are tied to the demise of Evergrande. As they grew, so did their network of workers, investors, and industries that depended on their business. 

Countless stakeholders, from the banks who lent the loans to Evergrande to the raw material suppliers who fuelled the construction of apartment blocks, are all immediately reliant on the performance of the property management company. The market for iron is particularly susceptible to changes in demand from its biggest consumers, and particularly China. The price of iron ore has fallen as much as half since May and the Evergrande crisis has added to iron exporting countries’ issues. Australia, who has already suffered from China banning Australian exports on coal, wine, and barley, now confront a declining iron industry as China used to account for 80 per cent of exports.  

Furthermore, over 200 of the banks and financial institutions which the indebted firm reportedly owes money to must now have a gameplan for a money lending fallout. If the loans are defaulted on, these institutions will have to rein back their loaning operations just so they can use this money to stay afloat. A situation called a credit crunch is imminent, which is where banks drive up the price of loaning preventing consumers from taking out credit which would ultimately stagnate the economy as purchasing becomes limited. The repercussions of this situation will reverberate across the lives of regular people across the country, similar to the effect experienced across the world in the 2008 financial crisis. 

Has the size of Evergrande forced Beijing’s hand? 

Beijing has a long history of being ruthless with private corporations. News of China flexing their brutality is not hard to come by where Beijing halted online credit provider firm Ant Group from going ahead with the world’s largest initial public offering just last year. However, a large-scale economic slowdown could not be more badly timed as China continues to recover from COVID-19, build the pride and power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and face increasing difficulties from the West. 

Over 13 per cent of China’s GDP was dedicated to real estate investment in 2019. In the August of 2020, Xi introduced the “three red lines” guidelines which further clamped property developers’ capabilities. This new scheme tightened lending to the real estate sector in a bid to control housing prices. Consequently, Evergrande sold 28 per cent of its property management unit for $3 billion and sold property at heavily discounted prices, further pushing the firm to liquidate. In addition, Evergrande shares were suspended from being traded on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Suspensions are exceedingly rare and only happen in dire times such as the probable liquidity and bankruptcy of a company. Evidently, the collapse of Evergrande is imminent, and a big player will be lost in one of China’s biggest sectors.  

Still, real estate investment has slowed down and has even fallen relative to GDP since 2014. This could be the consequence of Xi’s manifesto in 2013 when he declared to “shift the focus to improving the quality and returns of economic growth … to pursuing genuine rather than inflated GDP growth”. Unsurprisingly, Evergrande has made continuous land investments, shifting talents and resources away from areas of economic need such as trade, manufacturing, and technological innovation. Beijing may have already decided that Evergrande is not to be part of their long-term plan years before.  

Will Beijing put together a bailout? 

Based on the evidence made available, I do not believe China will bail out Evergrande. The CCP cares too much about its public image - and justifiably so, as precedent is key in their regime. Saving a company which has borrowed so recklessly would be embarrassingly hypocritical. Evergrande had many property development competitors who have not had the same troubles under the same circumstances. It is more likely that Beijing will solely invest more into successful firms to fill the void. The now largest property development company is the state-owned Vanke, which I am convinced will receive heightened government attention through investment or guidance.  

China’s population growth rate is nearing zero despite the new three-child policy introduced this May. China’s slowing birth rate will lead to a slowdown in development, an ageing workforce, pension problems, and a social divide between the young and old. Adults have been reluctant to have children in the current environment and extortionate housing prices are partially to blame. Ultimately, Xi is intently keen on reigning in house prices and creating a secure financial system. While the country may have to endure the high short-term costs of the fall of Evergrande, the prolonged sustainability of China will justify the harsh means of the CCP. 

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