Introduction

The sudden reemergence of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan came after the USA’s withdrawal of military support in 2021. The west greeted this event with a mixture of horror and cynicism as the Taliban rapidly repealed advancements in human rights and women’s education.

However, to the surprise of many western observers, the Taliban also imposed a ban on the country’s infamous opium and narcotics production industry in April 2022. The cultivation of opium poppies, which serve as a key material in the production of heroin, made up at around 9-15% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and had itself become deeply associated with Afghanistan. A ban may seem totally in line with the fundamentalist Islamic ideology of the Taliban, but why suddenly crack down on such a major source of income? Especially as this is the source of income that funded their resistance to US forces

The ban on narcotic production and the destruction of poppy fields are certainly major events in the Taliban rule, yet they conceal a hidden industry that propagates itself even under this ban. When the poppies are burnt, profit must come from somewhere. For Afghanistan, this takes the shape of a synthetic drug: methamphetamine. 

Background- A Shift in Production

Some background is needed. Meth has always had a presence in the Middle East, with Iran previously being the biggest producer of the product. After a series of reforms involving both harsh repression and progressive programs, Iran was able to reduce both the production and consumption of crystal meth within its borders. However, this also left a significant gap in the market that was only partially filled by exports from Mexico and Southeast Asia. 

So, the domestic Middle-Eastern supply of meth was fairly low and relied on exports. The price was high and smuggling was the lucrative trade for the region. It is here that the story of Afghan meth begins. Initially, meth production took place alongside opium production using synthetic sources of Ephedrine- a key ingredient in meth production. Some medicines are known to contain the chemical, and were utilised in small scale production as a result.

What advantages were there to such production? For one, the high price of meth means that you need a lot less land and labour to produce an equivalent value of meth compared to opium. The high prices of meth make even the work of a single labourer in a hastily constructed meth lab extremely profitable. Such labs are also mobile and hard to detect, which made the industry possible even under US rule. Opium still remained the drug of choice with its long established networks of production and sale. Besides, obtaining the expensive synthetic elements was out of reach for smaller farmers and simply unnecessary for larger poppy farming landowners. 

The ban on opium has now changed this dynamic. The Taliban’s operation against opium producers has been successful in reducing the amount of land used for opium production by 95%. With opium no longer kind, an opportunity has arisen for the harvesting of another drug precursor: ephedra. 

Ephedra is a naturally occurring plant in Afghanistan, and is an important source of the methamphetamine precursor ephedrine. This plant has only a limited history in drug production and is thus currently still abundant in the north of Afghanistan, fostering cheap meth production. As such, there has been something of a revolution in the Afghan narcotics industry. The price of producing crystal methamphetamine has reduced by half, facilitating a deluge of the product into the region. An increased supply of the product has been followed by a growing demand as falling costs make the drug more accessible to the poorest in society.  Seizures of Afghan produced meth have more than doubled in neighbouring countries. 

Although using cold medications as a source of ephedrine is more efficient the low price and high availability of Ephedra means that the industry continues to grow. Afghan meth is now crossing the borders of it neighbours on an unprecedented scale. 

Winners and losers: the social element of narcotics production 

Of course, the situation is never as simple. This increase in meth production is embedded within a complex web of socio-political relations that define both the rise in meth production and serve as its limiting factor. These factors are deserving of some investigation.

Notably, there hasn’t been an industrial cultivation of ephedra or ephedra-based method production. Most of the ephedra-produced meth in Afghanistan finds its origins in the central highlands of the country, where it is then sent to small cottage industries in the south. Ephedra fields are still few and far between, especially with the Taliban’s willingness to clamp down on such operations.

So, what happened to all the drug producers? There is a stark class dynamic at play in this phenomenon. Afghan opium was indeed produced by small farmers and cottage industries, but it was also favoured by large landowners. The generational accumulation of land allowed for the large scale cultivation of opium by landlords. This process was significantly developed, with the struggling peasants serving as an efficient source of wage labour for farming operations. It is these landlords who were able to build up a stockpile of opium before the ban and supply the little opium that is still exported. The announcement of the Taliban’s opium ban caused opium and heroin prices to skyrocket. Fears of a price crunch led to stockpiling of opium by larger landowners and was further exacerbated by a one-year lag between the bans announcement and implementation, which allowed for harvests to be completed and stockpiles to be accumulated. For now, the landowners hold plenty of supply and a limited incentive to sell as the prices continue to rise. The rich need not resort to ephedra farming just yet, especially when they are also able to afford the more efficient chemical precursors for meth production. The incentives for large scale ephedra farming are not yet developed.

The opium ban has been particularly harsh on the small farmers who relied on opium poppies to make their farms profitable. Climate change, the subdivision of farms, and poor irrigation have made many smaller plots of land unprofitable without farming high-value opium. Other alternatives like wheat or almonds require far too much investment and yield far too few returns to replace opium. These farmers remain in a state of complete economic precarity, with little surplus to build up stockpiles of opium or money. As such, a strong incentive remains for smaller farmers to harvest ephedra for meth production, or to maintain illicit opium farms. Meth production thus finds its basis in small scale industry and the inefficiency of farms. 

There may remain a possibility for increased ephedra farming in the future. The loss of up to 500,000 jobs from the destruction of poppy farms accompanied the return of Afghan migrants from Pakistan has led to rapidly increasing unemployment and underemployment for all segments of society in Afghanistan. Both the unemployed and underemployed lack the means to carve out even a meagre existence, and are thus reduced to small scale narcotics production or wage labour. With a large supply of cheap labour and few alternatives, an expansion of the narcotics industry could still be on the cards.

The economic situation continues to worsen in Afghanistan, making the prospect of ephedra harvesting evermore viable. The aforementioned inefficiency of farms is increasingly worsened by climate change and an overall lack of capital investment in Afghan industries. This is gradually disenfranchising farmers who used to rely on their land as a source of subsidence, further pushing the necessity of ephedra. Of course, economic turmoil is affecting all strata of society. The Taliban’s disenfranchisement of women has been coupled with an increase in the number of women in home industry who are now drawn into this economic struggle to survive. The elderly and young are also being drawn into the economy to help alleviate some of the pressure households face. The struggle to survive and prosper is drawing more and more people into the workforce and threatens to spur on further illicit production.

These underlying conditions set narcotics production in motion and maintain its growth. A desperate population in worsening conditions is weighed down by a history of drug production and export. Such conditions make meth production both viable and desirable. In them, they hold the potential for a massive expansion of the Afghan meth industry.  

A Land of Poppies and Ephedra: The Current Situation

The current state of the Afghan economy and society ensure that the drug trade will continue. Already, poor economic, environmental, and social conditions seem likely to continue deteriorating.

Such problems have an embedded nature that makes them extremely difficult to solve. Some observers have even suggested lifting the opium ban while others have looked to the gradual development of other businesses and investments in the region. However, without solving the root issues of dispossession and inefficiency, these actions may simply be too gradual to affect meaningful change.

For now, the Taliban faces a seemingly insurmountable challenge. Force has been successful in enforcing policy and edict, But how long can external force suppress the effects of internal issues? The question remains open, and Afghanistan awaits an answer.

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