Cross-strait relations have been one of the most controversial and widely discussed Geopolitical issues of the 21st century. Although the self-governed island claims itself as a sovereign state, Beijing has constantly emphasized that the Taiwan problem is one of its most untouchable political redlines. As Sino-US relations deteriorated over the past decade due to China's growing economic influence, intentions in the Taiwan Strait escalated at an accelerating rate. It is reasonable to assume that the future course of development of cross-strait relations will be primarily determined by Beijing's attitude. Therefore, this article will very briefly explore the historical and ideological significance of Taiwan to China.

Contrary to Western popular belief, the most fundamental reason for Beijing’s persistent aspiration to reclaim the island of Taiwan is not rooted in pragmatic causes, but in the historical significance of the deed, or more specifically, the historical significance to the Chinese leaders personally. To illustrate, the thinking of Confucianism is deeply embedded in the culture and values of East Asian countries like how Christianity was deeply embedded in the culture and values of Western countries. The doctrine of Confucianism places an incomparable importance on one’s service to one’s national interest, viewing that as the most noble deed. Additionally, Confucians also place great importance on one’s historical reputation, as they view being able to go down in history as a renowned figure as one’s ultimate objective in life. Historically, the recovery of lost territory is commonly considered a great service to one’s country. For instance, Zheng Chenggong of the late Ming dynasty who regained Taiwan from the Dutch colonizers is still praised in the elementary textbooks of Mainland China and used to be praised in the textbooks of Taiwan. Moreover, Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty reunified Taiwan into China and later historians considered that as one of his biggest achievements. The regain of Taiwan also marked to beginning of an age of prosperity in the Qing dynasty, which associates the regain of Taiwan with the regain of the mandate of heaven and the dawn of China’s golden age.

Almost all of China’s political leaders model their actions after previous regime leaders. For instance, when the US intervention in the Korean Civil War happened, Mao Zedong was originally reluctant to send troops to back Kim Il Sung as Mao’s most trusted general Lin Biao opposed war against the US. However, Mao later noted off the record that widely criticized Ming emperor Wan Li successfully protected Korea from a Japanese invasion and it would be utterly unacceptable for him personally if history regarded him as less competent than Wan Li.

There is good evidence that Xi Jinping is keener to model himself after historical Chinese regime leaders because Xi embraced Confucianism more than any Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader before him. To illustrate, the number of new Confucius Temples reached record heights after Xi rose to power. Xi also openly complimented Zeng Guofan who is the most renowned Confucius scholar of the past few centuries, but Zeng has often been denounced under the previous CCP narrative since he crushed the Taiping peasantry rebellion and protected the interest of wealthy landlords. Most importantly, Xi’s distinguishing political ideology is Xi Jinping Thought and “The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” which is more than evidence of Nationalism with Confucian characteristics. Conclusively, it is sensible to assume that Xi views the regain of Taiwan as the greatest mandate to this generation of Chinese leadership and to him personally. Since the most important national decisions of China are made by the dozen members of the Political Bureau, one can suppose that if the 5th generation of Chinese leadership considers regaining Taiwan as their biggest mandate, then it is the mandate of the entire China.

Besides the historical significance of Taiwan to China, the island plays an equivalently significant role in China’s political and ideological environment. To outline the basic principles of China’s ideological environment, one must address a fundamental difference between the intra-party abdicated leadership of China and the multi-party elected leadership of Western. It is well documented that Chinese leaders are selected by previous leaders based on their reputation within the party and achievements. Most popular Western media in present days recognize the consistency of government policies as a characteristic of the abdicated system of China, but the popular Western media do not see the more important aspect of this system as the inheritance of values and worldview. To illustrate, the character of the succeeding generation of Chinese leaders must be collectively approved by the previous generation of Chinese leaders which naturally leads to a succession of political ideas and values. Moreover, since the legitimacy of every generation of Chinese leaders is derived from the previous generation of Chinese leaders, elder CCP revolutionaries can continue to influence the political landscape even long after they have retired and left office.

In further detail, it is essentially the eight elders of the CCP who drew the early 21st-century political landscape of China by nominating two consecutive generations of general secretaries. The eight elders included senior revolutionaries such as Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Cheng Yun, who have led the CCP since the First Chinese Civil War. In the eyes of these senior Chinese revolutionaries, the Chinese Civil War has never ended, and it is the CCP’s historical duty to achieve the complete unification of China by ending the independence of the Taiwan regime. The same worldview is shared by contemporary day Chinese leaders, which is why it is written in China’s constitution that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s territory.

In addition, the consistency of the worldview of CCP’s leaders also led to its consistent narrative of Taiwan to the Chinese public. From the 1950s to the present day, China has used textbooks, TV programs, news, and other means of propaganda to not only persuade its citizens that China will inevitably regain Taiwan, but this will happen soon. Similarly, the KMT used propaganda to persuade the Taiwanese that they would soon launch a campaign against mainland China before they lost power. Consequently, the vast majority of contemporary Chinese people are highly emotionally opposed to the concept of Taiwan independence similar to how they are opposed to Japanese fascism. The embedded belief of regaining Taiwan in the Chinese public opinion can boost nationalist sentiments, especially in the case of escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait region.

In summary, Clausewitz once famously said that “war is an extension of politics” and one cannot truly understand a country’s foreign policy without diving into the country’s political system and history. Undoubtedly, politics is primarily concerned with pragmaticism. However, the most pragmatic approach to politics isn’t to solely seek immediate pragmatic payoffs. Therefore, in order to understand China’s perspective on Taiwan, it is highly necessary to explore the profound political mechanism and historical root of the Chinese civilization. 

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