News and media play a crucial role in Taiwan's democratic development. During the authoritarian period under Chiang's rule, reporting was restricted, and only media outlets associated with the ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), were granted special licenses. Some democratic pioneers attempted to challenge these restrictions and published journals such as the Free China Journal in the 1960s and the Formosa Magazine in 1979 to promote human rights and democracy. However, they were arrested and barred from publishing for years, embedding the seeds of political confrontation in Taiwan’s media landscape. When the ban was lifted in 1988, numerous news media emerged, most of which still exist today. Currently, Taiwan has more than eight 24-hour news channels, an enormous shift from the limited media landscape under authoritarian rule to media freedom. Taiwan now ranks highly in journalistic freedom globally, yet the quality of its media content is often criticized (RSF, 2024). Over-competition has led the media to prioritize sensationalism over verified news and to race to capture exclusive stories. 

Political talk shows have become particularly popular due to their low production costs and ability to generate sensational content. CTS News Square is the first political talk show in Taiwan, modelled after U.S. political talk radio, starting as a call-in program (Spencer, 2014). However, one unique feature was its ability to invite politicians to participate directly, reflecting the close ties between media and political parties. City councillors, legislators, or cabinet members are usually invited to debate on public policies on public talk shows. This arrangement benefits both media and politicians, as the media can produce popular content cheaply, while politicians gain visibility and can showcase their eloquence and confidence to the public. Since the early 2000s, the number of political talk shows in Taiwan has grown from around 20 to nearly 70 by the 2010s, with even more emerging on online platforms. To attract more attention, political commenters often dig out some scandals or unusual news, but more or less exaggerate or over-infer the story. Sometimes the discussion can be beneficial in forming public opinion and spur the movement to advocate the concept or to urge the government to change the policy. For instance, in 2013, the death of 24-year-old conscript Hung, Chung-Chiu gained national attention after extensive media coverage, leading to a movement that pushed the defence department to reform its policies (See Note 1). However, in other cases, exaggerated media coverage has resulted in negative consequences. For example, former President Tsai, Ing-wen faced unfounded accusations of favouritism toward a biotech company, TaiMed Biologics, which were sensationalised by political talk shows. These accusations, although later disproven, indirectly caused her to lose the campaign and damaged investor confidence in the biotech industry and discouraged medical professionals from returning to Taiwan (See Note 2).

As discussed, Taiwan's proliferation of political talk shows sometimes benefits society by prompting debate on social issues. Journalists and politicians use these platforms to bring the information under the cover to light and make politics closer to the public. On the other hand, these shows can also serve as partisan weapons, creating conflict and misleading voters with unverified claims. This raises the question of whether political talk shows contribute to political polarization or help reveal the truth through debate. Furthermore, regulating such media is challenging in a democratic society like Taiwan. Taiwan adheres to the principles of constitutionalism: the rule of law, democracy principle, and procedural justice (張文貞, 林子儀, 葉俊榮, 黃昭元, 2023). A key tenet of democracy is the public will be able to discern the truth through open debate in a perfectly competitive speech market. Yet, Taiwan's media environment is more similar to monopolistic competition, with oligarchs controlling much of the information availability and speech power. These companies instead of delivering accurate news, can use partisan content to solidify their supporters' beliefs. Many studies in political economics suggest that such an environment can lead to greater political polarization, as people find it increasingly difficult to judge whether information is accurate, let alone form balanced opinions (Anne E Wilson, Victoria A Parker, Matthew Feinberg, 2020). These challenges urge government regulation, but setting boundaries is difficult. On one hand, opposition parties may accuse the government of attempting to control speech; on the other, lacking regulation may lead voters to make decisions based on false information. Thus, this toxic media ecology system makes political talk shows fuel audience engagement with partisan content, which seems to contribute to polarization.

A recent debate surrounding the National Communications Commission (NCC), which regulates media behaviour, shows the complexities of this issue. In the past, NCC commissioners were appointed by the executive branch and approved by the legislature. Years ago, opposition parties argued that the current approval process is insufficient oversight. They propose reforming the appointment process so that commissioners are appointed in proportion to the seats held in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's parliament. This proposal aims to prevent undue influence by the ruling party over media regulations (呂翔禾, 2024). Concerns about media control were heightened when CTITV, a mass media company, was denied renewal of its broadcasting license in 2020 for repeated violations of media regulations (See Note 3). This decision was unprecedented, as it marked the first instance of a media losing its license since Taiwan lifted its journalistic restrictions in 1988. CTITV has been accused of having pro-Communist ties, which raises concerns about the media serving as an agency for foreign influence. Given Taiwan’s tense relationship with China, there are ongoing concerns about the potential for media outlets to serve as tools for political infiltration.

In summary, political talk shows have become a prominent feature of Taiwan's media landscape, shaping public opinion and influencing political developments. While these shows have increased political engagement among Taiwanese audiences, they also pose risks, including potential foreign influence and media-driven polarisation.

Bibliography

Notes pertain to well-known events at the Taiwanese level, for those unfamiliar with these events there is further reading provided

Note 1:

 Taiwan refuses to renew pro-China news channel's license AP Taipei Government Taiwan Complaints | The Independent

Note 2:

Taiwan protest over Hung Chung-chiu death - BBC News (BBC news, 2013-Taiwan protest over Hung Chung-chiu death)

Note 3:

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Anne E Wilson, Victoria A Parker, Matthew Feinberg, 2020. The role of (social) media in political polarization: a systematic review. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, Volume 34, pp. 223-228.

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Note that opinions expressed in the above article do not represent the stance of Asiatic Affairs committee members, Students' Union UCL or University College London. If you have read something you would like to respond to, please get in touch with uclasiaticaffairs@gmail.com.