In Southeast Asia, political landscapes are increasingly dominated by familial legacies, with what we often term “nepo-babies”.  This trend is evident across Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Cambodia, where legacy politicians continue to yield power over their respective governance structures. With recent information dominated by different power narratives, this article examines specifically the mechanisms of Thailand and Indonesia’s political landscapes and the implications for the self-proclaimed “democracy” imputed by the countries. 

From Canada’s Justin Trudeau to George W. Bush in the United States, nepotism is one of the most common- often underexamined- features of an electoral democracy. This is much like the rest of Asia, where political dynasties have long taken fixture. Nevertheless, what’s different about Southeast Asia? 

Thailand: The Shinawatra Political Legacy 

Thailand’s political landscape stands as a quintessential example of the entrenchment of political families. Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a telecommunications tycoon, rose to power in 2001 but was later removed due to allegations of corruption and abuse of legislation. But it was undeniable Thaksin continued his influence in Thai politics through proxy parties and loyal politicians. Now, in 2024, Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra stands as the youngest prime minister in the country, continuing the family’s political legacy despite continued resistance from the conservative establishment of the military-backed elite. 

One of the notorious examples of their influence is the introduction of the elite military course proposed by the National Defense College (NDC). Introduced by the elite Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram, the NDC was set to socialise the country’s top military officers, police, and civil servants. Later, at the beginning of the 2000s, the NDC began accepting politicians into its nexus. The body’s control over key policy areas, such as economic development in underdeveloped regions of Thailand, and national security legislation, has created an additional layer of influence over elected officials. While the NDC praises neutrality, its biased blanket of protection over entrenched power structures undeniably stands. A recent development within the NDC is the launch of the “mini NDC,” formally known as the “National Defence Course for Future Leaders.” This initiative represents a significant departure from past programs, which required a minimum age of 50 or above for participation. The new course is designed for younger candidates aged 35 to 42 and has expanded its recruitment beyond traditional political and military figures to include media influencers, IT professionals, scholars, writers, and consultants. 150 successful candidates were unveiled last February, and many bared familiar surnames. The Prime Minister, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, herself stood as one of the three elected advisory boards, illustrating the grooming ground for the next generation of Thailand’s political elite. This expansion of the NDC’s influence into younger generations demonstrates how Thailand’s political dynasties are ensuring their continuity through state-backed leadership training initiatives. It also reflects broader trends in Southeast Asia, where elite political families strategically position their heirs within institutional frameworks that secure their dominance in governance.

Indonesia: Jokowi’s Political Evolution 

For Joko Widodo (Jokowi), subverting democracy was initially a survival mechanism. His first term was fraught with hostility from parliament, including opposition factions and even his own party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Conservative Islamist groups further threatened his administration through mass protests that sought to destabilise his rule. While patronage has long been a key feature of Indonesia’s coalition-based democracy, Jokowi’s use of coercion to neutralise opposition has been unprecedented in the post-Suharto era. The government intensified the repression of Islamist groups, resulting in unlawful killings and the disbandment of organisations under questionable terrorism charges. Jokowi also oversaw the passage of a sweeping labour reform law, which curtailed worker protections, diluted environmental safeguards, eased foreign investment restrictions, and facilitated government land acquisitions.

Jokowi placed loyalists in key law enforcement positions, effectively transforming the security apparatus into a mechanism for suppressing civil dissent and weakening mechanisms of vertical accountability.

This power consolidation laid the foundation for dynastic succession. In the 2024 election, Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, was controversially cleared to run as vice president alongside Prabowo despite being under the constitutional age requirement. This move cemented the growing trend of hereditary political ascension in Indonesia, marking a significant shift from the country’s post-Suharto democratic norms. The increasing normalisation of dynastic politics suggests that Indonesia’s political landscape is becoming more entrenched in familial rule, a pattern also observed in Thailand. 

The ascendance of 'nepo babies' in Southeast Asian politics is not merely a regional phenomenon but a broader reflection of the limitations of democratic consolidation in the region. While political dynasties provide stability and continuity, they also undermine the principles of democratic representation, accountability, and meritocracy. This raises the question of what the future holds and how long the dynastic politics will sustain in such countries. Only time will illustrate the impact of the entrenched power structures influencing civil society and electoral laws, and the unexpected is to be foreseen for the future.