The article is part of the 'Hong Kong Anti-extradition Demonstrations: One Year Ago Today' initiative which aims to raise awareness for the movement and also to debunk some myths regarding the movement’s origins and core elements.

Due to the article's original length, we have had to split its content over separate pieces. For a more complete understanding of foreign government reactions to both the Anti-extradition Demonstrations in 2019 and to the current National Security Law, please refer to the links below.

• OPINION: Apocalyptic Headlines and Sensational Story Headings: Hong Kong’s Role as ‘A Mere Pawn’ in the Game of US-China Relations

• INSIGHT: The ‘Limp and Inane’ versus the ‘Outspoken’: Part One - Britain’s responsibility for the ‘Hong Kong Problem’

• INSIGHT: The ‘Limp and Inane’ versus the ‘Outspoken’: Part Two - The EU Reaction

• INSIGHT: The ‘Limp and Inane’ versus the ‘Outspoken’: Part Three - Economic Sanctions, US Decertification of Hong Kong’s Special Status and Potential Repercussions

However, due to the constantly-changing nature of recent events, it has been impossible to update the article without turning it into a series of short unrelated summaries. To ensure constructive debate, the published article has been limited to ‘Part One: Britain's responsibility for the 'Hong Kong Problem'. Parts two and three which will briefly discuss the EU reaction and the consequences of US economic sanctions will be published in due time.

The ‘Limp and Inane’ versus the ‘Outspoken’: Foreign Government Reactions to the Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Demonstrations in 2019 and Whether They Have Changed Since.

From the Anti-Extradition Demonstrations in Hong Kong back in 2019 to the current controversies over the Hong Kong National Security Law, Hong Kong’s issues have since become a focal point of international attention. Whilst most remain as onlookers, bystanders to the regional chaos and conflict, at times commentating their rhetoric, the ‘Hong Kong problem’ has been mostly dominated by three voices; two which are audible and the other, muted and subdued.

PART ONE: Britain’s responsibility for the ‘Hong Kong Problem’

Britain and its continual assertion of the validity of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. What was said one year ago today and what has changed since? Why has the UK kept so quiet and do they actually have a ‘legal responsibility’ and a ‘moral obligation’ to take action against the proposed National Security Law?

Britain’s responsibility for the ‘Hong Kong Problem’

As a co-signatory of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Britain’s relations with Hong Kong are much closer than those shared with the US.

Signed in 1984, between British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, the joint declaration gave Hong Kong its current status as a ‘Special Administrative Region’ and illustrated Hong Kong’s rights and freedoms to a high degree of autonomy; independent judiciary, separate financial and immigration systems as well as freedom of expression and to legally protest. The Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, upholds the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle.

Back in June 2019, British reaction to the Hong Kong Anti-extradition Demonstrations was mild to say the very least. Prime Minister at the time, Theresa May, had expressed ‘deep concerns’ for the safety of the Hong Kong people and the British that were living there. Whilst she asserted that it was ‘vital that those extradition arrangements in Hong Kong are in line with the rights and freedoms that were set down in the Sino-British joint declaration’, Foreign Secretary at the time, Jeremy Hunt, iterated rhetoric just as mild in strength, urging the authorities of Hong Kong to listen to the demands of people and to ‘engage in meaningful dialogue and take steps to preserve Hong Kong’s rights and freedoms and a high degree of autonomy, which underpin its international reputation’. Echoing May’s statement, Hunt added that ‘upholding the principle of ‘one country, two systems’...was vital for Hong Kong’s future success.’ Last Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, assessed that the Bill was a ‘terrible blow’ to rule of law, against Hong Kong’s stability and security, against Hong Kong’s position as a great international trading hub.’

In summary, the British response to the events in 2019 was of mild disapproval over the proposal of the Bill and achieved little except from repeated emphasis on the importance of upholding the ‘rule of law’, maintaining ‘rights and freedoms’, and abiding by the Sino-British Joint Declaration as well as the principle of ‘One Country, Two systems’. However, this initial exchange in positions and its following discourse is indicative of a gradual retreat; the progression of the demonstrations saw little action from the government itself but plenty of actions taken by alternate actors.

Even in the current climate, Britain remains to be moved by controversies over the National Security Bill and its response so far has even been described as ‘limp, inane and could have been copied and pasted directly from their previous statements’. As aforementioned, history has a tendency to repeat itself and Britain’s somewhat unnerved response to the Anti-extradition Demonstrations last year has left many wondering the extent in which the British government had a ‘legal obligation’ to respond to the ‘Hong Kong Problem.’ No doubt back in 2019, Brexit talks had dominated British political discourse and there was little room for a detailed discussion of the issues in Hong Kong and remained merely in the ‘foreign-policy periphery’. One year later, British political discourse has been totally incapacitated by Coronavirus efforts. With recent discourses flared up over Dominic Cumming’s lockdown scandal, will it be witnessed a greater reaction in Britain as protests resume in Hong Kong?

Recent updates to Britain’s reaction are addressed in the later subsection, ‘Britain’s Reaction: ‘Too Little, Too Late’?’

British government inaction and the Chinese government ‘nullification’ of the Sino-British Joint Declaration

As prophesied by Benedict Rogers, Founder of Hong Kong Watch, who had warned back in 2019 that ‘failure to act could be interpreted by China as a ‘green light’ to continue encroaching on Hong Kong’s freedom’, China’s condemnation of Jeremy Hunt’s statement back in June as ‘improper interference in China’s internal affairs’ was only the start to series of open encroachments and challenges to the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang made clear in a statement in June 2019 that the joint declaration was an ‘a historical document that no longer had any practical significance’ and that ‘the UK has no sovereignty, no power to rule and no power to supervise Hong Kong after the handover.’ Despite later clarification by Britain Foreign Office spokeswoman that the joint declaration was ‘legally binding’ and confirmed of its validity as a document and Britain’s legal responsibility to take action, China’s forceful repudiation of Britain’s previous statements was apparently sufficient to dampen the British reaction. The British response that was seen afterwards was characterised by mild statements, meaningless disapprovals and actionless rhetorics. Its inaction is comparable to appeasement as ‘refusing to enforce the treaty is an invitation to violate it with no repercussions’. The key takeaway from this being that ‘Beijing knows Britain will not act, so they are behaving as if the treaty does not exist’.

However, the conjecture isn’t really about Britain’s ‘legal responsibility’ versus its ‘moral obligation’ but about its leverage over the ‘Hong Kong issue’. As suggested by Tim Summers back in June 2019, Former British Diplomat and fellow at Chatham House, ‘there is nothing explicit in the joint declaration...no phrase that can be used to justify saying that Britain has some legal responsibility to Hong Kong anymore.’ Despite localist support for British intervention, individuals have since clarified that ‘China is not pretending that the agreement doesn’t exist, it is simply pointing out that its powers were limited to the final years of colonial rule and expired on the last day of the British administration.’ As evidenced in the joint declaration under item 3: (2) ‘The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People’s Government,’ Britain is neither a guarantor nor a mediator of the region, on which China’s exercises sole sovereignty over. Despite the inability to intervene in Hong Kong’s affairs, overt violations of the terms stipulated in the joint declaration continues to stand as justification for Britain’s response. However, its ‘quietness’ serves as an indication for potential covert motivations.

Evidently convinced by China’s previous denouncement of Britain’s reaction, Britain has remained quiet and subverted during the past year of events and has ‘curiously taken to letting the Americans do all the shouting nowadays’. In light of events from the previous year and the recent events as a result of the National Security Law, closer investigation reveals that the UK may in fact have ‘too much at stake’ to confront China over Hong Kong. Ever since the Brexit Referendum 2016, debates over the future of Britain in terms of trade and foreign relations have always dominated the political discourse. Whilst one year ago, it had arguably provided a convenient excuse to neglect its ‘moral and legal duties’ to Hong Kong, recent events over the National Security Law and public pressure has brought Britain’s inactivity to light and have called for a greater reaction.

Whilst results from a readers poll conducted by the Express indicate sound support for Boris Johnson to speak out against China’s proposed legislation, with a majority 91% of readers voted ‘yes’ and only a mere 8% opting for ‘no’ (1% opting for ‘don’t know’), there are obvious reasons as to why there is an apparent reluctance from the UK in its involvement with recent Hong Kong affairs.

Government reluctance to take action is largely due to its current intents to further economic and diplomatic relations with China. On both official and business levels, cooperation remains tense and uneasy. Even in just the recent weeks, intimate talks have been held between the health secretary, the deputy national security adviser and the Chinese Ambassador to London. Whilst Boris Johnson has kept its contingency plan for the country relatively private, the UK remains as the number one European destination for Chinese foreign investment. Trade levels before the pandemic were at their highest in the past few years and China continues as the UK's third-largest market. On a backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic, dire economic situation and staggered Brexit negotiations, the UK's lack of involvement have gone largely unnoticed by but that is no longer the case. Pressure from actors both domestic and abroad have seen minor shifts in Britain’s position but it remains too early to determine the extent to which they will speak out on the ‘Hong Kong Problem’.

Recent updates to Britain’s reaction are addressed in the later subsection, ‘Britain’s Reaction: ‘Too Little, Too Late’?’

Britain’s Reaction: ‘Too Little, Too Late’?

Contextualising the Hong Kong Bill 2019-2021, understanding the relaxation of ‘BNO’ acquisition, and the calls for the grant of refugeehood.

Now that Britain’s inactivity is addressed and the positions of various actors broadly talked about there remains a final need for a comparison between the position of the British government and those of other British actors.

Note that the reactions illustrated below depict the series of reactions and actions taken before the passing of National Security Law in the National People’s Congress on the 28th of May. Much of the foreign government reactions observed during the law’s deliberation has translated into direct action. However, much has happened since the law’s approval and the below addresses potentially outdated issues.

The Hong Kong Bill 2019-2021

The sentiments expressed amongst Britain’s leaders have always been some variant of oral discontent and extremely passive. However, pressures on the government to take action over the ‘Hong Kong Problem’ did not gather in strength overnight and it definitely wasn’t China’s implementation of the National Security Law that triggered widespread reactions amongst Britain’s parliamentarians. Close attention to the ‘Hong Kong problem’ can arguably be traced back to the start of the Anti-Extradition demonstrations.

Parliamentarians like Alistar Carmichael had always stood for Britain to take greater responsibility for the wellbeing of citizens of Hong Kong. Not only has he explicitly stated that the UK has a ‘duty’ to the people of Hong Kong, he as well as many others have long stood for the reopening of the BNO offer (see below). His proposed Hong Kong Bill 2019-2021 which aimed to ‘place requirements on the Government relating to the Sino-British Joint Declaration 1984 and human rights in Hong Kong; to make provision about immigration for Hong Kong residents including granting rights to live in the United Kingdom; and for connected purposes’ received its first reading in February and is due its second reading in the House of Commons for September 11th 2020.

As part of a long-standing campaign for the UK government to extend BNO holders full citizenship, government actions to widening visa rights under the BNO is news welcomed within this group of parliamentarians. However, reactions from the remainder of Britain speaks for themselves and views differ for those held by supporters of the BNO move.

Widened visa rights under the BNO

The BNO passport refers to a passport held by ‘British National Overseas’ and allows visa-free travel to the UK for a period of six months but not residency or work. Those who were born before Hong Kong was handed back to China in 1997, qualify for the BNO passport. Currently, there are an estimated 300,000 people that hold a BNO passport and an additional 2.9 million that are eligible. BNO holders are also unable to pass this status on to their children. Calls for the relaxation of restrictions over residency, work permits and extending the status to all immediate family members have been made.

This has arguably generated the most discourse in both the citizens of the UK and also the people of Hong Kong. It had been hinted previously in a disclosure by the Sunday Express that Britain was ‘ready to welcome Hong Kong refugees’. In the report, it was said that ‘Boris Johnson has a secret plan to allow hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong citizens to come to Britain if China clamps down further on the former British colony’ and that he had told MPs earlier in the year when at his private countryside abode that ‘he would be prepared to give Hong Kong citizens refuge and had received unanimous support regarding this move’. Whilst the lack of clarity over whether this move would include just the 315, 000 BNO holders and their extended families or the entire 7.5 million population of Hong Kong had caused panicked reactions amongst the people of Hong Kong, their concerns have now been addressed.

Previous concerns in the UK over the widened rights as a violation of the joint declaration were dispelled after affirmation from lawyers which clarified that BNO rights are considered as Britain’s internal affairs and has no implications for the joint declaration. As of 29th May, Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has since made the ‘unprecedented’ offer to extend the visa rights of existing BNO passport holders to 12 months of work and study; stating that this creates not only a ‘pathway of citizenship’ for the 300,000 BNO holders but also the 2.9 million that are eligible. Prime Minister Boris Johnson followed up on this announcement with an op-ed published in South China Morning Post and the Times of London on June 3rd which confirmed that ‘if China imposes its national security law, the British government will change our immigration rules and allow any holder of these passports to come for a renewable period of 12 months and be given further immigration rights, including the right to work, which could place them on a route to citizenship’. Shortly after this statement of clarification, reiterating Britain will not ‘walk away’ from the ‘Hong Kong problem’, Dominic Raab further announced on June 4th that he has spoken to Five Eyes allies (US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) to ‘share the burden’ of possible Hong Kong exodus.

However, Britain’s historic overhaul of the visa system is not without its challenges. Johnson’s clarification that ‘Britain does not seek to prevent China’s rise’ but ‘it is precisely because we welcome China as a leading member of the world community that we expect it to abide by international agreements’ offers little reassurance for the efficacy of the declaration. This would be the first time BNO regulations have been changed and the widening of its visa rights creates significant implications for Britain. Known to have always been intent on ending the free movement of European citizens and also to introduce new points-based immigration, this unprecedented move has received varied responses; some calling for the UK to ‘move on’ from memories of its colonial powers and others for full citizenship to BNO. Even Nigel Farage has been reportedly telling Boris to ‘Wake up!’ as Beijing plots ‘power grab’. Out of fears over the violation of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, Farage openly calls out Johnson over Twitter, urging him to intervene and deemed China’s actions over the National Security bill as an ‘appalling power grab by China over Hong Kong.’

Support for Britain to practice interventionist measures are not just prevalent amongst the select few. In a joint letter addressed to Raab, the seven former British secretaries, Labour and Tory, demanded that ‘as a co-signatory of the Sino-British joint declaration the UK must be seen to be leading and coordinating the international response to this crisis and ensuring the integrity of the treaty lodged at the United Nations in 1985 and one country, two systems.’ Lauded as a ‘rare cross-party initiative,’ the new axis between Labour, Tories, Lib Dems and even the Scottish Nationalists and the Greens can be further evidenced in the ‘Rule Britannia’ declaration led by Chris Patten; former governor of Hong Kong.

Former Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, Takes Lead in Unifying International Support

Out of everyone, Lord Chris Patten is seemingly the most outspoken over the ‘Hong Kong problem.’ Whilst it may be justified in his status as a former governor of Hong Kong that has therefore always received considerable media coverage, the extent of his authoritative powers poses a challenge to, again, the efficacy of his most recent actions.

‘Enshrined’ in various news media outlets like BBC, The Guardian as well as possessing his own column on the Financial Times, Patten’s condemnation of China’s actions over the National Security Law as a ‘flagrant breach of the Sino-British Joint Declaration’ has received extensive media coverage. Published as an Opinion piece in the Financial Times on 24th May, Patten further declares that ‘the G7 must stand up for Hong Kong’s freedom’ and that ‘Britain should lead the way as the territory protests over the national security law.’ Patten explicitizes his concerns over Hong Kong’s national security law and demands that the UK must ensure that the issue of Hong Kong must be on the agenda for the G7 meeting next month. Urging that Britain must ‘take a lead in standing up for Hong Kong and for honouring the treaty obligations’, Patten has expressed that he believes the UK has ‘a political and moral obligation to do so.’

The unprecedented announcement of the Hong Kong National Security Law had seen him take the lead in organising a cross-party international coalition of 893 international parliamentarians and policymakers from 36 countries (updated 10th June) decrying its implementation. Backed by Former UK Foreign Secretary, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who has expressly referred to China’s actions as ‘the most serious threat to the people of Hong Kong that there has been from the Chinese Government since 1997’, the extent of international support for Hong Kong urging for the upholding of the ‘one country, two systems’ principles.

However, in the most recent turn of events, China has warned Britain to ‘stop all interference in Hong Kong’s affairs or there would be consequences.’ Once again reminded to ‘give up its colonial state of mind,’ Britain’s actions have been condemned by the Chinese Foreign Ministry as a violation of international law and face ‘substantial damages.’ Even before, the government’s initial reluctance to widen BNO regulations is reflective of a certain degree of an ‘unconvinced’ attitude; ‘unconvinced’ that they have a ‘legal obligation’ to respond to the ‘Hong Kong problem’. Patten’s call for a UN special envoy, whilst admirable and widely appreciated, his authoritative powers in its implementation are still to show for itself. In the face of ‘threats’ from China, which has stated that the UK had the most to fear from any clashes with China, statements of condemnation have raised the prospect of China blocking a free-trade deal with the UK if the country didn’t back down. The discourse around economic benefits and political interests continues today and implications for widened BNO rights are still to be seen. It's far too early to judge its impact but conspiracies have already been shown over that the BNO action was merely an ‘empty promise’; marking the first, and last, of the UK's actions against China.

Editors' Note: As a blanket disclaimer for the entire ‘Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Demonstrations: One Year Ago Today’ initiative, we will not be disclosing the identities of any of the contributors to the initiative. We thank everyone who has submitted a piece of their own work and we apologise for not being able to openly accredit you for your contributions.