China on Palestine
The silent partner, hidden from view—China's approach is simple in the volatile realm of Middle Eastern politics: Do not confront and resolve things diplomatically. While China’s role may seem secondary or removed, it manoeuvres quietly, guided by a foreign policy deeply rooted in President Xi Jinping's vision of China: China, the representative of the Southern World and the alternative to America.
China, Palestine, Israel and the wider Middle East
Historically, China has been very pro-Palestine and anti-Zionist. Mao saw China’s revolution as part of a larger fight against Capitalist Imperialism across the world. Alongside Imperialism and colonialism, he grouped zionism together with the struggles of Arabs against Zionism to be one that China should, in principle, support. This support was reflected, for example, in 1975 when China voted in favour of UN General Assembly resolution 3379 that defined Zionism as a “form of racism and racial discrimination”. Even long after Mao was gone, this position on Israel was not forgotten in both China and Israel. Resolution 3379 was revoked in 1991 with a majority vote. China was absent for it. In summary, from its conception in 1949 to the 1990s, the Chinese position on the Middle East was clear-cut, anti-zionist, pro-Palestinian. But with internal struggles during the period, China’s support for Palestine only could go as far as words in the UN and speeches by party members.
But change came upon the dynamic. During the 1990s, relations between Israel and China began to normalise, and even become good. The two countries established formal diplomatic ties in 1992, and in 1993, Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin visited China. During his visit he discussed views on the Middle East with China but mostly was there on a business opportunity. China was becoming a huge economy thanks to the modernisations from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin. There was an opportunity for investment that Israel was looking to receive. But this was not the first time Israel and China had openly talked to each other. Large Sino-Israeli arms trade where China paid money for arms and military technology, with reports raging between $3Bn to $10Bn worth of total exports in the 1990s. China became Israel’s second biggest importer, with imports from China doubling from $8Bn in 2012 to $16Bn in 2022. Israel has also been a benefactor of the Belt and Road initiative, with Chinese construction firms completing projects from the Haifa New Bayport Project to the Tel Aviv Metro Red Line construction and operation.
China’s engagement in Palestine and Israel is part of a larger, strategic vision for the Middle East: presenting itself as a stable, hands-off economic partner. The good businessman who wants to do business and the good diplomat who just wants to talk. This approach has seen China play a role in Palestinian reconciliation, overseeing talks between Hamas and Fatah. Just two months prior, China hosted the Arab-Chinese Summit, where key agreements—the Beijing Declaration for a China-Arab community and an Action Implementation Plan for economic development in Arab countries—were signed. Last year, the theme of the Belt and Road Summit was investment in the Middle East, with the first Policy Dialogue on the agenda labelled as “Tapping into the Potential of the Middle East”, which had speakers from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, and UAE. As UCL’s Dr. Igor Rogelja puts it, “China positioned itself as a reasonable partner for peace and will take any opportunity to appear like a more reasonable partner in comparison to the USA.” but along with the understanding, as UCL’s Dr Ala’a Shehabi puts it, “China stays out of their domestic politics, and they stay out of China’s”
Energy, however, is China’s major interest here. About 55% of China’s oil imports came from the Middle East in 2022, fueling its manufacturing sectors. This dependency has led China to build projects across Saudi Arabia and the UAE and makes stability essential, as any disruption could impact oil prices, which power around 60% of China’s economy. China is also the only nation ignoring the embargo on Iran, which accounts for 90% of Iran’s oil exports—even though this makes up less than 0.2% of China’s own oil use. Stability in the region is thus a practical need for China, beyond diplomacy, since instability risks driving up the price of imported oil.
Following the 7th October attacks, China responded with a statement: “We’re deeply saddened by the civilian casualties and oppose and condemn acts that harm civilians.”. But China has also since been one of the biggest critics of the invasion of Gaza on the international stage. At the start of 2024, China and Russia conjoined to veto the American resolution on Israel and Palestine as they fell short of calling for a ceasefire, and multiple statements from China’s Foreign Ministry have reiterated China’s stance standing next to Palestine with one such statement as “Ending the occupation is not an option, but an obligation; ending the fighting is not just the appeal of one country, but international consensus. It is therefore unsurprising that Israeli-Chinese relations have soured, although, just a few months earlier, reports emerged that Netanyahu had planned a trip to China in October 2023 as a signal of his frustrations to President Joe Biden.
China’s consistent criticism of Israeli actions and being the diplomatic big brother for Palestine in the UN has only added frustration to Netanyahu and Israelis. A poll in April this year conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies shows that 56% of Israelis thought of China as unfriendly or hostile to Israel, and only 2% believing China as an ally. As a result, Israel and Taiwan are forging closer connections to each other. Two Israeli political delegations have been sent to Taiwan since October 7th, whilst Taiwan has spoken out in support of Israel and in bringing home the hostages with $500m in support to IDF soldiers.
As for the Palestinians, China remains a valuable partner who holds the powerful veto in the UN and sway on diplomatic ways in the Middle East. China’s track record of hosting peaceful talks, such as between Saudi Arabia and Iran and Russia and Ukraine. But while Israel received direct material support from much of the Western world through financial and military aid, Palestine receives votes in the UN and words of support, such as Xi Jinping’s words in support of Palestine in May this year. As Dr Ala’a Shehabi said, “China’s support is important, but felt it could be doing more…China will not confront the West”.
The American question
The role of the United States is one of the first questions that arises in almost any international discussion, and it's especially important here given the enduring U.S.-China rivalry. With the competition between these two powers often described as a "New Cold War," there are high tensions despite Biden’s decision to uphold many of Trump’s tariffs on China. Unfortunately, with the election of President Trump, the future is filled with more questions than answers.
Upon Trump’s inauguration as President, his administration might take a harder line on China, possibly escalating tensions with tariffs, a strategy he previously pursued during the 2016 trade war, which ended in stalemate. According to Dr. Igor Rogelja of UCL, further economic pressures could push China to reconsider some international projects, like the Belt and Road Initiative. Furthermore, during his first term, Trump recognised Jerusalem as Israel's capital, backed the Abraham Accords, ordered a U.S. strike in Iran, and withdrew troops from northern Syria. This “unpredictable” approach to the region could create further instability despite Trump’s claims that he would bring peace to the Middle East. Trump has also given an indication of how he would have supposedly prevented the war from ever happening, saying on Jo Roagn’s podcast: “We would have never had the attack on Israel at all. Iran was broke. I told China, "If you buy, you can't do business in the United States under any circumstance." I was going to, we're going to go cold turkey with China”
Still, the U.S. remains the dominant security presence in the region. With Russia deeply engaged in Ukraine and China unlikely to directly confront the U.S., America’s role as the Middle East’s security guarantor remains largely unchallenged. Experts, such as those at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, note that while China doesn’t seek to replace America’s influence anytime soon, it does aim to position itself as a diplomatic alternative, advocating for non-intervention and respect for each country’s domestic decisions. Dr. Igor points out that while China’s path to prosperity depends on stable U.S. relations, it “doesn’t mean they won’t needle the US where they can”.Or as the Indian Minister S.Jaishankar said, “For the last 20 years, the United States has been fighting but not winning in the Middle East, and China has been winning but not fighting in the Middle East.”
The silent partner, hidden from view—China’s approach in the Middle East rests on two main pillars. First, it’s the calm alternative to the USA: the partner that won’t meddle with your regime but will bring large-scale economic development and work toward diplomatic resolutions. Second, it’s the leader of the Global South, a country that claims to stand for justice and to oppose what it sees as imperialism. For the U.S. and Israel, China, in the short to long term, presents strategic competition. But for Arab nations like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE, it’s a long-term partner that aligns with their visions for the future. And for Palestine, China is a friend at the UN—though one they hope will someday offer more than words.
Bibliography
https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/china/support-arab-people.pdf
https://www.mei.edu/publications/israel-and-china-time-choosing
https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/all-news/article-757044
https://www.beltandroadsummit.com/conference/bnr/en/belt-road-summit-2023
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-taiwan-forging-closer-relationship
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202409/t20240929_11500459.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sbFp5eP6Ic
Note that opinions expressed in the above article do not represent the stance of Asiatic Affairs committee members, Students' Union UCL or University College London. If you have read something you would like to respond to, please get in touch with uclasiaticaffairs@gmail.com.