India’s ‘Big Brother’ Dilemma in Post-Hasina Bangladesh: Is the Strategic Handshake Over?
Sheikh Hasina’s close political alignment with Narendra Modi has been central to strengthening Bangladesh-India cooperation, but her resignation throws this partnership into uncertainty.
Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina from Bangladesh (left) and Narendra Modi from India (right) ahead of their meeting at Hyderabad House, New Delhi, in June 2024 (source: livemint.com).
As we approach the six-month mark since Sheikh Hasina’s departure from Bangladesh and her role as prime minister, the implications of her exit continue to unfold. The public protests that forced her resignation were fuelled by long-standing grievances over a quota system reserving 56% of government jobs for specific groups, including 30% for descendants of freedom fighters; the system has severely limited opportunities for unemployed youth, who were left with only 44% of available positions (The Daily Star, 2024). Although Hasina abolished the quota system back in 2018, a court ruling in June 2024 deemed the government order illegal, driving protesters to the streets. The initially peaceful protests soon devolved into violent clashes following Hasina’s reference to the students as ‘rajakaar,’ meaning ‘traitors’—a term denoting pro-Pakistan collaborators during the 1971 Liberation War of Independence (Rashid, 2024)—which resulted in brutal crackdowns by police and the Awami League’s student wing. The staggering death toll of approximately 266 people, including 32 children (Sakib, 2024; UNICEF, 2024), laid bare not just the sheer scale of violence but also the deep-seated frustration with the Hasina government. Following Hasina’s resignation and the military’s takeover, Bangladesh’s governance faces volatility that potentially strains its relations with India, considering the strong diplomatic and trade ties between Hasina and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Amidst the precarious transition under an interim government, New Delhi’s handshake with Dhaka has started to lose its grip—raising a big question about whether New Delhi can sustain its stronghold as South Asia’s ‘big brother’ amidst the crisis next door.
Hasina's nearly two-decade-long tenure, marked by considerable economic progress, has paradoxically threatened to reverse the move toward greater democracy. Since June 1996, except for a brief period in opposition, Hasina and the Awami League have turned Bangladesh from a nation struggling to feed its population into a food exporter, with its GDP soaring from $71 billion in 2006 to $460 billion in 2022, establishing it as South Asia’s second-largest economy after India (Campbell, 2023). Yet, the benefits have been uneven, deepening socio-economic inequalities and fueling public dissatisfaction, as many struggle with rising living costs and limited access to essential services. Furthermore, the Hasina government has increasingly adopted authoritarian measures, such as suppressing dissent and allegedly engaging in corruption (BBC News, 2024c), raising serious concerns about democratic backsliding. These concerns came to a head during the January 2024 elections, where the Awami League secured a fourth consecutive term for Hasina, marking her fifth overall (BBC News, 2024a). Despite the victory, allegations of manipulation marred the election, with mass arrests targeting leaders and supporters of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the main opposition party, ahead of polling day (Macdonald, 2024; Islam, 2024). The irregularities sparked nationwide protests, with calls for quota reforms becoming a focal point of public discontent. In response, Hasina imposed repressive measures, including curfews and internet shutdowns (BBC News, 2024b), which only heightened public outrage and undermined her legitimacy further. As protesters celebrated her resignation by climbing and vandalising almost 1,500 sculptures in Dhaka (Prothom Alo, 2024), authoritarian tactics and unaddressed grievances in her government sparked the public's climb for democratic change.
As Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigns on August 2024, people in Dhaka celebrate by climbing her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's statue in Bijoy Sarani (source: en.prothomalo.com).
While Hasina’s departure was celebrated nationally, India viewed her exit as a critical strategic setback. The resulting power vacuum could allow less India-friendly forces, such as the BNP or pro-China factions, to gain control, fundamentally reshaping regional power dynamics. India’s Neighbourhood First initiative, which is primarily focused on countering China’s regional influence (Xavier, 2020, p. 10), faces a significant challenge now as a consequence of this shift. Bangladesh’s centrality to India’s strategy stems from historical ties dating back to the 1947 Partition and the 1971 Liberation War, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Partition created East Pakistan as India’s neighbour, leading to tensions owing to the Bengali population facing cultural and economic marginalisation, sparking the Liberation War in which India played a fundamental role. Post-independence, Bangladesh’s political shifts between a secular democracy and an Islamic republic presented security concerns for India, especially regarding potential alignment with Pakistan. This tension was particularly pronounced in the late 1970s, with Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq and Bangladesh under General Ziaur Rahman posing strategic challenges (Lawal, 2024). As the founder of the BNP, General Ziaur Rahman shaped the party’s cautious approach towards India via his nationalist policies—prioritising national sovereignty and historical grievances over collaboration with its larger neighbour. After Hasina and the Awami League came to power, Bangladesh started to foster closer ties with India by restoring transport links, rebuilding infrastructure, and facilitating cargo movement along the Brahmaputra (Kapoor, 2024), consequently enhancing regional connectivity. Such moves have bolstered India’s strategic interests, with Bangladesh serving as a vital maritime route through the Bay of Bengal, connecting South Asia to global markets and offering crucial access for military operations, especially in countering rival powers like China. Furthermore, Bangladesh-India security cooperation has strengthened, with Hasina helping India curb insurgency in Assam by denying refuge to rebels (Kapoor, 2024). Collectively, these factors indicate how Hasina has played an indispensable role in India’s regional strategy.
The prevailing power vacuum further adds to the ever-growing stack of challenges facing India's Neighbourhood First initiative. For many years, India has established itself as a dominant force in South Asia, frequently dubbed the 'big brother' owing to its large economy, geographical size, and military power; there is, however, a growing concern that its approach has gone unilateral—expecting its neighbours to rely on New Delhi on crucial economic and security matters. Post-Partition and the emergence of newly independent states, India upheld a strict territorial definition of sovereignty, a self-reliant protectionist economic framework, and a non-aligned foreign policy that shielded the region from global affairs (Xavier, 2020, p. 7). This situation resulted in a "disconnect" between India and its South Asian neighbours—particularly with smaller nations like Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives, whose demands have been sidelined for a long time. Alongside India’s increasingly uncooperative stance, the rise of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has provided smaller nations with an alternative to Indian influence. The BRI’s financial support has led countries, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, to start to perceive China as a neutral—if not beneficial—force, pressuring India to navigate regional dynamics more strategically (Mohan, 2021). Two primary consequences emerged: (1) debtor-state politicians deepened ties with China to counterbalance India and boost their economies, and (2) India launched the Neighbourhood First policy to stabilise regional ties, which had grown volatile due to internal weaknesses and China's rise as a wealthy alternative partner. Hence, New Delhi already faces an uphill battle in fostering closer regional ties through the Neighbourhood First, a task made even more challenging by Hasina’s resignation and wider regional issues—e.g., Sri Lanka’s financial instability and Nepal’s leadership reshuffles—which underscore India’s diminishing regional influence.
India’s grip on Bangladesh is slipping—not just due to leadership changes but also because of rising discontent among the Bangladeshi people, including within the interim government. By backing Hasina’s increasingly autocratic leadership, New Delhi has distanced itself from a key regional partner—with Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government Muhammad Yunus’ (2024) warning of deep resentment due to the steady erosion of democracy, evidenced by the allegations of electoral frauds in the 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections. Moreover, anti-India sentiment is at an all-time high, fuelled by India’s broader shift toward a Hindu-centric political framework, with fears over the 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and inflammatory remarks from Indian officials serving as key flashpoints. Introduced by Home Minister Amit Shah, the CAA fast-tracks citizenship for non-Muslim migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, sparking concerns of religious discrimination. Shah further provoked backlash by labelling Bangladeshi migrants as “infiltrators” and grouping them with Rohingyas, a statement widely seen as derogatory and dehumanising, deepening resentment in Bangladesh (Scroll, 2024). The fallout could be profound: a more nationalist, anti-India government in Dhaka that may pivot towards China and Pakistan, reshaping regional power dynamics. Indian media have already seized on this uncertainty by pushing claims of foreign interference—i.e., China and Pakistani intelligence—and exaggerating attacks on Hindu minorities to paint the unrest as part of a larger geopolitical ploy (Mahmud & Sarker, 2024). Beyond the narratives, real economic stakes are on the line, as the previously robust US$13 billion trade relationship and a potential free trade agreement (Business Today, 2024) now hang in the balance. The interim government's reassessment of existing agreements, notably the power purchase deal with India's Adani Group, has significantly reduced electricity imports from Adani's Jharkhand plant (Varadhan, 2024). This move underscores the fragility of economic ties in the absence of Hasina's pro-India stance and may prompt Bangladesh to strengthen relations with alternative partners like China.
Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus (center) is sworn in as the chief adviser of Bangladesh's new interim government in a ceremony led by President Mohammed Shahabuddin (left) in Dhaka (source: aljazeera.com).
Hasina's resignation has had a profound and multifaceted impact on Bangladesh-India relations, yet the security fallout could be substantial for India, especially regarding border security and extradition dynamics. First, the ensuing political instability in Bangladesh has prompted India to heighten vigilance along its shared border to prevent potential spillover effects, for instance, illegal crossings of migrants and insurgent movements. Historically, insurgent groups from India’s northeastern states, such as the United Liberation Front of Assam, have sought refuge in Bangladesh, taking advantage of the porous borders. With Sheikh Hasina no longer in power, the current unrest raises concerns about a resurgence of these insurgent activities. Hasina's administration was instrumental in curbing their operations, and Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has warned that her departure may allow these groups to reestablish bases, threatening regional security—particularly with the potential displacement of religious minorities (The Hindu, 2024). Furthermore, attacks on minority communities in Bangladesh, especially Hindus, have heightened fears of refugee influxes into India, further straining border security (Dieterich, 2024). Such an influx could exacerbate communal tensions in India, particularly in border states like West Bengal and Assam, where demographic shifts have historically been a flashpoint for political and ethnic unrest. Second, in December 2024, the Yunus-led interim government formally requested India’s assistance in extraditing Hasina to face several charges, including allegations of crimes against humanity and genocide (The Guardian, 2024). The Ministry of External Affairs of India has confirmed receipt of the extradition request but has not made any public statements regarding its intended actions. It is important to note that the existing extradition treaty between the two countries, established in 2013, provides a legal framework for such requests (Tiwary, 2024). This treaty allows India to deny extradition if the request appears politically motivated or lacks good faith. Given its longstanding support for her administration, India’s decision on Hasina’s extradition could reshape diplomatic ties, casting doubt on its commitment to justice versus strategic interests.
Finally, a power vacuum in Bangladesh may equate to a strategic vacuum that China and Pakistan are poised to exploit. On the one hand, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments in Bangladesh have established a significant foothold, with the Padma Bridge symbolising China’s growing influence. This development is particularly notable following the World Bank's withdrawal of support due to corruption issues, which China subsequently addressed by stepping in to fill the gap (Mohan, 2021). China has invested approximately US$7.07 billion in Bangladesh, with Chinese companies securing construction contracts worth US$22.94 billion across various sectors (Noyon, 2023). With Hasina's departure, Beijing may seize the opportunity to deepen its influence, potentially at the expense of New Delhi’s traditional ties with Dhaka. On the other hand, Pakistan seeks to rekindle its historically complex relationship with Bangladesh, which has been strained since the Liberation War. Earlier this year, Yunus engaged in bilateral discussions with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to normalise ties, as Bangladesh-Pakistan relations have been marked by minimal trade, restricted movement, and limited official cooperation (Naji, 2025). Recent efforts to normalise ties include Pakistan lifting visa restrictions for Bangladeshi citizens in 2021 and resuming direct trade in February 2025 after a 50-year hiatus (Reuters, 2025). This rapprochement could undermine the counterterrorism progress achieved during Hasina's tenure by potentially facilitating the movement of extremist elements across borders, undermining existing security measures in the process. In the end, these developments pose a dual challenge for India: countering China's expanding economic presence and addressing the potential resurgence of destabilising forces facilitated by renewed Pakistan-Bangladesh ties.
Chief Adviser of the Interim Government of Bangladesh Muhammad Yunus (left) met Prime Minister of Pakistan Shehbaz Sharif (right) in New York in September 2024 (source: himalmag.com).
A lesson learned is in sight: to keep its handshake with Bangladesh from slipping, India must recalibrate its approach—engaging with the interim government, reaffirming goodwill, and addressing concerns over minority protections to avert a potential refugee crisis. With anti-India sentiment surging in Hasina’s absence, the limits of its 'big brother' role and Neighbourhood First initiative are clearer than ever. As Dhaka shifts its foreign policy towards Beijing and Islamabad, New Delhi must strengthen regional alliances to counterbalance emerging challenges, necessitating a more proactive approach in South Asian geopolitics. To this end, India should engage with Yunus and the interim government while distancing itself from Hasina, a strategic pivot that allows India to cultivate ties with the emerging leadership and safeguard its security and economic interests. Additionally, balancing humanitarian concerns with border security will be vital for maintaining regional stability and upholding international obligations. Simultaneously, restoring democratic legitimacy through free and fair elections is essential for fostering political stability and public trust. Running the world's biggest elections back in 2019 (Vox, 2019), India is well-positioned to assist Bangladesh in enhancing democratic stability and electoral integrity owing to its ability to organise simultaneous national and state elections. Given the Election Commission of India’s success with initiatives like the Systematic Voters' Education and Electoral Participation (SVEEP) program, capacity-building efforts offer a pathway for India to bolster confidence in Bangladesh’s electoral process, preventing spillover violence to India's northeastern states and beyond. Ultimately, Hasina’s fall presents India with a difficult choice: does it double down on its influence, or step back and allow a more multipolar South Asia to emerge? Whether New Delhi navigates this shifting geopolitical landscape will shape the trajectory of South Asian power dynamics and its own regional standing.
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