The Quad: An Asiatic NATO?
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Japan, the US, India and Australia, known as the Quad for short, has commanded great attention from the world in recent years. But why is this dialogue so important? To answer that, we should begin from the history of the Quad.
History of the Quad
The first unofficial joint action of these countries can be traced back to a coalition to coordinate aid efforts for the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami crisis in Indonesia. 3 years later, in 2007, these 4 countries would come together again in a move widely seen as a reaction to counter the rapidly growing influence of China. Japan, the USA, Australia, and India officially announced their alliance under the banner of the Quad. This led to massive expansion on an unforeseen scale of the joint naval exercise known as Exercise Malabar. This resulted in fierce diplomatic criticism from China and domestic protests in India and Australia. Ultimately, the dialogue was shelved due to Australia, who withdrew because of its indispensable economic ties with China. But between 2009 and 2017, the foreign policy of China became more assertive, especially since Xi Jinping took power in 2012 and in the South China Sea. An example of China’s newfound assertiveness is the recent ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’, something which might have been nigh unimaginable just a decade ago. So, the 4 countries returned to the Quad. With their reunion on November 12, 2017, these 4 countries agreed on some key areas of cooperation: increasing political ties, freedom of navigation, maritime security, freedom of overflight in the maritime commons, respect for international law, the North Korean threat, and terrorism.
How does the Quad cooperate?
Probably the most important aspect of the Quad is their military cooperation. In November 2020, the Quad had their second joint exercise, 13 years after their first. The members also participated in a joint exercise with France, Exercise La Perouse, in the Bay of Bengal. Their military cooperation also materialises in less direct ways than multilateral exercises. For example, in the White House’s factsheet about the March 2020 Quad Plus summit, a particular topic piques interest: “Share Satellite Data to Protect the Earth and its Waters”. During the Cold War, development of satellite and rocket science systems were presented to the public under the name ''Space Race''. This allowed the US and USSR to work on missile weaponry in a way that would garner more support from the public. Furthermore, the satellite always been used to spy on other countries. With this information in mind, it is likely that the Quad is again presenting their military cooperation and development in a more palatable, diplomatic way. Beyond that, it is evident is that today’s hybrid warfare needs the defence strategies of countries to change and evolve. The new economic and data war demands a strategy that not only defends the members of the Quad against direct military threats, but also against modern crises like economic warfare, information warfare, cyber-attacks, and similar hybrid warfare methods.
Other than military cooperation, the Quad continues to build better diplomatic ties through virtual and in-person meetings, trying to find common interests and organise collaborative plans to solve them. The March 2020 summit focused on COVID-19, the climate crisis, partnerships on emerging technologies, infrastructure, and education. The Quad also established a Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group to generate dialogue on important technology supply chains, support the diversification of equipment suppliers, support cooperation in communications, monitor trends and opportunities in varied fields of technology, and coordinate standards for technology development both at the national and global levels.
The Possible Expansion of the Quad: An Asiatic NATO?
The March 2020 Quad Plus summit also convened representatives from New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam, which raises the question: does this mean that the Quad has been successful in reaching out to these other countries? And if so, why are these nations still hesitating to become official members of the dialogue? The most likely answer is that these countries still don’t have enough confidence that the Quad will be able to protect them from potential Chinese reactions, such as sanctions. So, the disadvantages of entering this partnership today still outweigh the advantages. And if the Quad wants to succeed in its goal of countering China, then the current members need to find a way to ensure prosperity and security to other countries and give them confidence in this risky political move. Interestingly, even with a general acceptance that the Quad is primarily a group to counter China’s growing power, the Quad members themselves avoid directly mentioning China in their statements. The reason for this is probably not be openly offensive or hostile. But this doesn't withhold China from protesting the agreement publicly. Zhao Lijian, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, said in a news conference in Beijing, “China always believes that any regional cooperation mechanics should not target a third party or harm its interests,'' while giving at the same time his predictions of the group not finding any global support and eventually failing.
All these actions have reignited questions of “Is QUAD going to become the Asiatic NATO?” Answers from leading political figures and strategists range from yes, no, maybe, it has potential and it will fail; it is by no means an easy question to answer. From China’s perspective, the answer may well be yes, as it blames the participating countries for creating aggression through this dialogue. On the other hand, the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Dr. S Jaishankar, has stated that it is incorrect to call the coalition an “Asian NATO”. Perhaps the most interesting thing is the differences in stance between the participating countries. The former US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun, said in an online seminar, “There is certainly an invitation there at some point to formalise a structure like this.” This is an interesting statement, as the biggest difference between the QUAD and NATO today is likely the lack of a concrete binding structure. In any case, if the QUAD is going to be an Asiatic NATO, it is important they consider what awaits them, and what they can learn from NATO’s experiences and mistakes.
It is also important that disagreement over contentious issues like data privacy and data localization is not the focus of this group. The purpose of the QUAD is to build a partnership, not to create barriers and walls, leading to friction and mistrust between the 4 nations. The current data policy and regulatory landscape in India are leading to doubts and mistrust. Building data-related walls will only lead to disintegration in the grouping at a time when sharing data and technology is critical to the partnership. Without trust, the Quad will stagnate and lose sight of its key goals at a time when the world order is in a state of flux.
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