Reconciling with the Motherland: the Future of Hong Kong Youth
“Hong Kong used to have freedom, now it’s lost all that. So why wouldn’t I go to mainland China, where at least things are cheaper?” - Anonymous (Bloomberg, 2020).
In February, Shenzhen had reached a new peak for the inflood of Hong Kongers, in response to the city’s flagship opening of a new Costco Wholesale. Cheap prices matched with Shenzhen’s tourist-friendly urbanization and employment opportunities has seen record-high numbers of Hong Kongers traveling to their Northern neighbor, in direct contrast to previous patterns of Mainland Chinese tourists flocking to the likes of Causeway Bay for premium shopping opportunities.
While a ‘stalling economy’ can be attributed to cheap prices across the city, Xi Jinping’s Greater Bay Area economic agenda has long positioned Shenzhen to be a premier hub of economic activity by boasting more favorable, accessible, and attractive business opportunities. Key to this economic reform has extended net benefits to Hong Kong; among these include the removal of work permit requirements for Hong Kong citizens in Mainland China, with proportional access to state healthcare and education (Financial Times, 2018). These benefits are salient among Beijing’s increased integration efforts for a post-protest Hong Kong climate, as the gravitas of these benefits were previously seen as a contested topic among outspoken pro-democracy Hong Kongers. For locals, attraction to Mainland employment could be viewed as contentious against the 2019 pro-democracy movement; however, it seems that elapsed time has eased this concern.
It’s clear that more and more youth are migrating to the Mainland in response to employment benefits, while those remaining in Hong Kong are increasingly attracted to Shenzhen’s commercial allure. A staggering stock market has further triggered the flight of major financial hubs making inroads in nearby nations like Singapore, exacerbating the numbers of youth exiting Hong Kong and favoring opportunities overseas. Employment trends have reported that in 2019, 52% of Hong Kongers were willing to migrate to cities apart of the Greater Bay Area, in striking contrast to the 72% pursuing ‘career and industry development prospects’ in 2022 (Global Times, 2022).
As the presence of Hong Kong people become more pronounced in the Mainland, the separation of political preferences and everyday life suggests how contemporary Hong Kong youth are charting post-protest waters.
Reflecting on 2019’s Protests
Examining Shenzhen as a ‘bargain city’ for Hong Kong observes complex outcomes for Hong Kong youth; the increasing need to ‘escape’ from ‘high costs, poor services, and limited choices at home’ begs how this group has adapted to the social landscape and in turn, formed new relationships with the Mainland (New York Times, 2024). In this space, it’s worthwhile to note how these same young, 20-something year old individuals had also once been the face of 2019’s pro-democracy protests. With 46.3% of protesters between ages 20-29, reports of protests circulated feelings of uncertainty regarding Hong Kong as a stable place to live (Statistia, 2019).
Figure 1: Who are Hong Kong Protestors? (Statista, 2019)
The protests played a conducive factor in shaping Hong Kong’s contemporary occupants, with a steep outbound of disillusioned families migrating out of the city following feelings of political insecurity. The 29,200 emigrants in 2019, compared to the 49,000 emigrants in 2020, reflects the urge for parents to send their children abroad for better employment opportunities and more stable political conditions. The elevated levels of violence witnessed during protests further reinforce such motivations to depart the city, as feelings of public security deficiency can lead to migration inclinations in pursuit of personal freedom. Parents who partook in protests have further placed child welfare over any sense of residual nationalism, reflecting their future-oriented approach when it comes to living in Hong Kong’s long-term political landscape (Lui et. al, 2021).
As such, the numbers of youth currently occupying Hong Kong are positioned at a critical crossroads, seeing how migration trends have begun reshaping the city’s values, norms, and behaviors. The post-protest climate necessitated the survival for local families in the city, while favorable employment opportunities and low prices propped up push factors for Hong Kongers. It’s worth asking, how can Hong Kong maintain its local culture when met against these circumstances?
Hong Kong’s Collective Memory
An angle to examine this references the idea of collective memory, defined as ‘a body of symbols, representations, and narratives about the past shared by a group of people [and is] a powerful resource that gives people a sense of who they are, shapes their social and political preferences, and mobilizes them to take action’ (Cheng and Yuen, 2019). For Hong Kong, a sense of ‘collective memory’ is most prominent among the city’s most distinct episodes of public resistance; demands within the anti-extradition movement were able to unite a wide group of Hong Kongers, and as a result, collate shared experiences of protest violence into this concept.
Nevertheless, as more individuals depart from Hong Kong and protest motifs fade into the past, the collective memory of Hong Kong's status as a special administrative region becomes increasingly strained. In contrast to other East Asian societies, such as the collective memory of comfort women in Japan and its implications on Japan-Korean relations, public symbols are more feasible. Such forms of resistance visualize physical statues of comfort women survivors, or overseas communities continuing the collective memory through information exchange. This comparison underscores the preservation of a sense of "unity" or "collectivism" amidst contemporary changes, reinforcing the inability of Hong Kong's current conditions to reflect such practices.
For youth still remaining in Hong Kong, the extent to which a collective memory can be recovered against Chinese political-economic integration is minimal—records of the protests are confined to the fragments of memories rather than physical spaces, closing a vacuum of visual resistance in the city. As such, a distinct ‘collective memory’ in Hong Kong is unable to find reception in a city once dominated by ‘freedom-loving youth’ (Bloomberg, 2024).
Crossing into Shenzhen
Shenzhen’s rebranding came at an optimal time for Hong Kong’s changes; local youth are more inclined to visit than ever, with their wallets and careers in tune with opportunity. Even Cantonese—the mother tongue of Hong Kong—has been adopted in select Shenzhen stores and services, further linking the two cities under one Mainland umbrella.
While this very ‘truth’ may appear as a stark reminder of a coloured protest history, it deeply reflects Hong Kong’s current socio-political conditions and subsequent Mainland integration. The general sentiments of Shenzhen-loving youth likely resonate with the many Hong Kong residents who find themselves in a city with fewer occupants, grappling with these transformative demographic and economic shifts. The implications of this will irrefutably observe social shifts within Hong Kong’s cityscape, with expensive prices and a volatile political climate breeding out-migration. Here, a wave of diasporic members originating from Hong Kong have also found voiceboxes through their new homelands, continuing their movement from abroad.
With a large number of people from Hong Kong emigrating abroad or moving closer to China, exactly how Hong Kong can revive the city’s economic and local fervor remains to be a challenge, yet may already be too late to convince the remaining youth in Hong Kong.
Works Cited
(No date a) Barriers come down in Hong Kong border town as China plans closer ties. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/7256193e-3673-454e-a633-3a022eb93bd3 (Accessed: 24 April 2024).
(No date b) Hongkongers fall for China’s Big Box Stores. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/c270dacc-4890-4421-8c36-b6881d049ddf (Accessed: 24 April 2024).
Bland, B. (2018) Greater Bay Area: Xi Jinping’s other grand plan , Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/fe5976d8-ab81-11e8-94bd-cba20d67390c (Accessed: 24 April 2024).
Garrett, G. (2021) Bay Area 2.0: How Hong Kong and China are forging a new innovation economy, LinkedIn. Available at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/chinas-road-map-silicon-valley-20-leads-hong-kong-geoffrey-garrett/ (Accessed: 24 April 2024).
Lui, L., Sun, K.C. and Hsiao, Y. (2021) ‘How families affect aspirational migration amidst political insecurity: The case of Hong Kong’, Population, Space and Place, 28(4). doi:10.1002/psp.2528.
Stevenson, A., Wang, Z. and Wang, O. (2024) Spicy Food and dental implants: Low prices lure Hong Kongers to China, The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/20/business/hong-kong-shenzhen-shopping.html (Accessed: 24 April 2024).
Photo source: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3257203/hong-kongs-mtr-corp-tells-public-expect-longer-travel-times-amid-easter-break-227538-people-head
Note that opinions expressed in the article above do not necessarily represent the overall stance of Asiatic Affairs, Students' Union UCL or University College London. If you have read something you would like to respond to, please get in touch with uclasiaticaffairs@gmail.com.
Want to write for us? Don’t worry about experience - we are always looking for writers interested in Asiatic affairs. Submit your ideas athttps://forms.gle/koQbsExb6XsAy1Tk6 and we’ll get in touch.