The War in Ukraine: A Battleground for an Asian Proxy War
The ongoing war in Ukraine has become a front line of many casualties: more than 100,000 civilians were reportedly killed, millions were deprived of resources, and a significant number of energy and medical infrastructures were irrevocably damaged. What remains less discussed in the headlines of newspapers is the geopolitical impact of the Russia and Ukraine war.
Security Issues of the Russia-Ukraine War
In recent intelligence reports, the US and its partners have highlighted a warning phase of the Ukraine-Russian war. The biggest announcement of its reports is that North Korean troops have entered Russia, potentially training to engage in the Ukrainian war (Cunningham). This development marks a great transition in North Korea’s involvement, transitioning from a supplier of ammunition to an active participant in the conflict. South Korea has responded swiftly, formally urging Russia to withdraw North Korean personnel and come forward with their current operations. However, the Kremlin has dismissed such claims (Hornung, 2024). South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) has identified dozens of North Korean troops, as well as North Korea’s missile expert Kim Jong-sik, at Russia’s training grounds. For North Korea, this war offers an unprecedented opportunity to field-test its military’s capabilities on foreign land- boasting 1.3 million active personnel and 7.6 million in military reserves (ibid).
Members’ Research Service. “Latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking].” EPRS, January 12, 2023, https://epthinktank.eu/2023/01/12/latest-on-russias-war-on-ukraine-what-think-tanks-are-thinking-2/
Furthermore, Russia gains a critical advantage in both manpower and military equipment as its estimated causalities climb past 200,000 in the past year (Institute, 2022). But what does North Korea gain from this? The promise Putin gives to North Korea is all alleged – however, it is estimated that in return North Korea will receive Russia’s unconventional and conventional creations of military technology by 2026 (Hornung, 2024). As this move solidifies their military relationship, it is critical to examine in the coming few weeks what the future holds for North Korea’s involvement in the war.
Western Responses to the War
For as long as most can recall, North Korea and South Korea have maintained a tense rivalry, marked by competition over military personnel, manpower, and advancements in military technology. This poses a significant challenge for South Korea, as recent economic and social upheavals have diverted its focus from advancing its military capabilities. This disadvantage has been backed by South Korea’s main Western support – the United States. The cooperation has drawn sharp criticism from the West. The U.S. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin warned of North Korea and Russia’s recent alliance, stating, “If [North Korean troops are] co-belligerents… that is a very, very serious issue. It will have impacts not only in Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific” (Brennan, 2024). Meanwhile, the Russian Ambassador dismissed the Western media’s remarks, asserting that North Korea’s involvement does not involve any infringement of South Korea’s security concerns (ibid).
Vladmir, Smirnov. “TOPSHOT-NKOREA-RUSSIA-DIPLOMACY.” Getty Images, June 19, 2024, https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/in-this-pool-photograph-distributed-by-the-russian-state-news-photo/2157787216?adppopup=true
This war involves more than security concerns. Moscow’s Asian support extends beyond Pyeongyang, with the power of China playing a pivotal role. Beijing supplies Russa with over 90% of its microelectronics 70% of its machine tools, and $300 million worth of dual-use goods monthly (Service, 2024). With their ever-so-lasting relationship, trade between China and Russia reached a record high of $240 billion in 2023, with a noticeably high 64% increase since 2021 (Reuters, 2024). Conversely, Kyiv benefits from a significant amount of support from East Asia’s democratic powers. Japan has contributed $12 billion in aid, including drones, vehicles, and military equipment, marking it as one of Ukraine’s largest donors (Hornung, 2024). Between January 2022 and June 2025, South Korea allocated 0.04% of its GDP as aid to Ukraine (ibid). This disparity between donor countries supporting the two sides in the war underscores the distinct geopolitical strategies shaping the responses of major Asian powers. It reflects their differing priorities in wielding influence through aid contributions and the provision of technological support, highlighting their nuanced approaches to the conflict.
Conclusion
The involvement of the respective Asian countries has transformed the Ukrainian conflict into a greater proxy battleground, yielding European security at the frontline of Asian geopolitical interests. With the major support of North Korea raising concerns regarding the proliferation of military alliances and lack of international order – China’s economic backing of Russia further complicates global efforts to isolate Russia. While Japan, the U.S., and South Korea continue their vocal and financial support for Ukraine. The U.S.’s new future president Donald Trump has also issued a warning at his campaign rallies that citizens could be on the brink of World War III as the U.S. adversaries started clashing with its allies (Service, 2024). This multifaceted involvement underscores the globalised nature of the Ukraine conflict, revealing the deep interconnections between security dynamics in Europe and Asia. The war stands as a focal point where regional ambitions and strategic alliances clash, reshaping the complexity of global politics.
Usmanov, Danil. “Protestors face off in Bishkek.” Eurasianet, March 7, 2022, https://eurasianet.org/ukraine-war-inspires-rival-passions-in-central-asia
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