Look up any statistical rankings of national economic growth, and India is usually near the top. India is the 5th largest economy in the world (Forbes India, 2024), with a staggering growth rate of 6.3% making it the 11th fastest growing economy, as of 2023 (Lu, 2023). One metric that it fares comparatively less well on, however, is GDP per capita; with a figure of 9.89k USD at purchasing power parity, it performs worse than both Namibia and Iraq on this front as of today (IMF, 2020). This reveals a glaring socio-economic gap in India, where economic success is not necessarily reflected in individual quality of life. 

Another quick Google search reveals an interesting explanation. India is beset by a huge problem of regional inequality. While there are many maps detailing growth by region in India out there, with different statistical interpretations of their own, all of them point to the same pattern: India’s Southwestern provinces are far higher-earning than the central eastern ones, such as Chhattisgarh, Bihar and Jharkhand (Statistics Times, 2023). While the South enables the financial boom of this population behemoth, the North may water it down. And a huge contributor towards this worrying reality of Northern social instability and economic stagnation is the largest terrorist organisation in the world, that many have never heard of. 

A Brief History of the Naxalites 

Naxalism generally refers to the continuing far-left insurgency in India (EFSAS, 2019). The movement’s name originates from the village Naxalbari, which saw a peasant uprising in May 1967, instigated by members of the Maoist sect of the Communist Party of India (CPI) (Das, 2010). This exacerbated pre-existing communist sympathies within parts of the nation, a by-product of lingering colonial landowning systems and inspiration drawn from successful communist uprisings in Russia and China (EFSAS, 2019), and lit the fire of a nationwide pan-communist political movement. Soon many organisations such as the CPI-Maoist and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) were formed, along with armed groups such as the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA). All such groups were referred to as Naxalites. As of 2010, there are 20,000 Naxal rebels active in India (Das, 2010). 

The ideology of the Naxalites apparently has many iterations, seeing as they are a collective of numerous groups, each claiming to be the truest practitioner of Marxist-Leninism (Sen, 1971). However, there are some unifying traits that can be identified, such as a strict adherence to Maoist ideology, and an emphasis on civilian uprising against the Indian system, perceived to be a product of neo-imperialism (EFSAS, 2019). Due to this aggressive political stance and the countless crimes they have committed in Central-eastern and Northeastern parts of India, the nation has since listed many such Naxal groups as illegal terrorist organisations (Das, 2010). 

Naxalite Activity

The Naxalites mainly operate in what is known to Indians as the Red Corridor, an area spanning states such as Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, where Naxal presence is strongest (PW ONLYIAS, 2023), but also Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh (EFSAS, 2019). They act exactly how one would expect guerrillas to act: use unconventional warfare tactics such as terror attacks, against authority forces, especially the police force (Pletcher, 2024). The most recent fatal conflict happened last month on March 3, where a police constable was shot dead by Naxal forces amidst gunfire exchanges (Naaz, 2024), while the most notable was perhaps the April 6, 2010 Dantewada attack in Chhattisgarh that claimed the lives of 76 security personnel (ETV Bharat, 2023). The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs states that domestic Left-wing Extremism (LWE) movements have claimed 9,004 lives between 2004 and 2023 (2023), a terrible statistic that speaks to the atrocities that the Maoist ultras have been responsible for. 

But Naxalite ideology extends beyond direct attacks on t defence forces. Since it dictates that every aspect of the Indian state is neo-imperial, these elements must be opposed by any means necessary. While landlords and businessmen may be seen as oppressive capitalists and, as such, obvious targets, the Naxalites also attack key infrastructure such as power lines, communications (Pletcher, 2024), prisons (EFSAS, 2019), factories, railway and mines (Das, 2010), aiming to hurt India economically. Naxal groups also seek to establish “liberated zones” that are under their control and jurisdiction, instead of the government’s; all such actions may dissuade foreign investment into Naxal-active areas of India. (Das, 2010). A research paper has found that implementing anti-naxalite armed forces in the state of Andhra Pradesh can be associated with its increase in its GDP per capita (Singhal and Nilakantan, 2016), pointing to how Naxalism has directly harmed India’s economy. 

Counter Measures 

While head-on counterattacks against the Maoist insurgency take up the bulk of India’s Counter-insurgency (COIN) plans (Lalwani, 2011), military operations so far have been insufficient to defeat Naxalism. There are two core reasons that Naxalites have been able to continue operations. India has gradually made strides in tackling them, with less and less Naxal-related incidents happening.Home Minister Amit Shah claimed in 2023 that LWE will no longer be a problem for India after 2 years (PTI, 2023). The first is sustained funding. There are multiple means that the Naxalites balance their accounts. The first are business operations within Naxal-controlled areas, which include drug production, mining, as well as extortive levies and commissions, which would not be possible without some degree of cooperation with large corporations and corruption within authorities in these states (Prakash, 2015). The second is external funding; while the Chinese is historically the biggest donor to Naxal groups, with cash and arms flows reaching its thickest during the Mao Zedong years (Chakrabarti, 1986), the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) seems to have helped a fair share during recent years (Prakash, 2015).

Aside from continuing the assault on naxalites to reduce their sphere of control, the Indian Government also has to tackle illicit funding, which poses a huge logistical challenge. However, New Delhi has long recognised this as an essential aspect of the fight against Naxalism, and implemented measures to thwart them. India uses its own Intelligence operations to discover any possible means that Naxalites acquire money and arms, and share it with paramilitary forces deployed against the Maoists (Priyedarshi, 2012). The Ministry of Home Affairs has, among many policies, formed multi-disciplinary Naxalite-monitoring groups with officers from central governmental agencies, and created a separate branch of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to oversee LWE Cases. And this multi-pronged approach has already seen success in exposing the finances of members of Naxal groups (The Economic Times, 2018). While New Delhi would not call out China and Pakistan for their links to the Maoists, India’s neighbours cannot possibly protest against domestic efforts to fight financial crime happening on Indian soil. As well as continuing the larger state-wide fight against corruption, the more India improves on this multi-pronged approach, the less power the Naxalites have on the ground. 

The second is continual recruitment. The Naxalite movement started because farmers and tribal Indians sided with Communist Revolutionaries in the Naxalbari Uprising, as they felt neglected by the government’s landowning and industrial policies (Das, 2010), as well as socially disenfranchised as wealth inequality worsened (Sen, 1971). That has resumed, and even expanded in the peak years of Naxalite activity, and for decades the Red Corridor has survived. While syphoning funds from local sources and destroying infrastructure no doubt hurts the social mobility of the poor, and perpetuates the cycle of poverty (EFSAS, 2019), as long as they perceive India as the oppressor, those in that very cycle will likely join the Reds’ ranks against New Delhi. 

It is clear to all, including Indian authorities, that the hearts and minds of Indians must be won backfor the Naxalites to lose its footing (Priyedarshi, 2012). For this, New Delhi recognises the importance to win the information war against the Maoists, and make those susceptible to Naxal influence realise how the Naxalites are using them as means to an end. The starting point for India ought to be ensuring that civilian casualties, unintended and intended (EFSAS, 2019), are minimised. The government has also then spread their own information campaign against the Naxalites, to inform them of the damage they dealt to Indian society (Sabha, 2014). 

Policymaking is also an essential tool deployed against Naxal forces: the government has put forth land reforms, grassroots employment programs, forest rights legislation, financial and social programs for surrendered Naxalites, and a large increase in infrastructure and development programs, all serving to lift more out of poverty and improve public perception against the state (EFSAS, 2019). India has seen less success here, compared to the financial front. While slow progress in enfranchising the poor and the tribes may be understandable for one of the world’s biggest developing economies, this effort must continue stronger than ever, for Naxalism to lose its zeal, for all such insurgencies of the same nature to fail in the future, and for India’s near 60-year wound to finally be healed. 

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